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Abstract
We study the classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real
line. In contrast to previous work, we assume that the agents are unable to fully specify
where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide coarse information—namely, that
their preferred location lies in some interval. Given such partial preference information, we
explore the design of robust deterministic mechanisms, where by robust mechanisms we mean
ones that perform well with respect to all the possible unknown true preferred locations of
the agents. Towards this end, we consider two well-studied objective functions and look at
implementing these under two natural solution concepts for our setting i) very weak dominance
and ii) minimax dominance. We show that under the former solution concept, there are
no mechanisms that do better than a naive mechanism which always, irrespective of the
information provided by the agents, outputs the same location. However, when using the
latter, weaker, solution concept, we show that one can do significantly better, and we provide
upper and lower bounds on the performance of mechanisms for the objective functions of
interest. Furthermore, we note that our mechanisms can be viewed as extensions to the
classical optimal mechanisms in that they perform optimally when agents precisely know and
specify their preferred locations.
1 Introduction
We consider the classic problem of locating a public facility on a real line or an interval, a
canonical problem in mechanism design without money. In the standard version of this problem,
there are n agents, denoted by the set [n] = {1, · · · , n}, and each agent i ∈ [n] has a preferred
location xi for the public facility. The cost of an agent for a facility located at p is given by
C(xi, p) = |p − xi|, the distance from the facility to the agent’s ideal location, and the task
in general is to locate a facility that minimizes some objective function. The most commonly
considered objective functions are a) sum of costs for the agents and b) the maximum cost for
an agent. In the mechanism design version of the problem, the main question is to see if the
objective under consideration can be implemented, either optimally or approximately, in (weakly)
dominant strategies.
While the standard version of the problem has received much attention, with several different
variants like extensions to multiple facilities (e.g., [PT13; LSWZ10]), looking at alternative objec-
tive functions (e.g., [FW13; CFT16]) etc. being extensively studied, the common assumption in
this literature is that the agents are always precisely aware of their preferred locations on the real
line (or the concerned metric space, depending on which variant is being considered). However,
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this might not always be the case and it is possible that the agents currently do not have accurate
information on their ideal locations, or their preferences in general. To illustrate this, imagine
a simple scenario where a city wants to build a school on a particular street (which we assume
for simplicity is just a line) and aims to build one at a location that minimizes the maximum
distance any of its residents have to travel to reach the school.. While each of the residents is
able to specify which block they would like the school to be located at, some of them are unable
to precisely pinpoint where on the block they would like it because, for example, they do not cur-
rently have access to information (like infrastructure data) to better inform themselves, or they
are simply unwilling to put in the cognitive effort to refine their preferences further. Therefore,
instead of giving a specific location x, they end up giving an interval [a, b], intending to say “I
know that I prefer the school to be built between the points a and b, but I am not exactly sure
where I want it.”
The above described scenario is precisely the one we are concerned about in this paper. That
is, in contrast to the standard setting of the facility location problem, we consider the setting in
which the agents are uncertain (or partially informed) about their own true locations xi and the
only information they have is that their preferred location xi ∈ [ai, bi], where bi−ai ≤ δ for some
parameter δ which models the amount of inaccuracy in the agents’ reports. Now, given such
partially informed agents, our task is to look at the problem from the perspective of a designer
whose goal is to design “robust” mechanisms under this setting. Here by “robust” we mean that,
for a given performance measure and when considering implementation under an appropriate
solution concept, the mechanism should provide good guarantees with respect to this measure
for all the possible underlying unknown true locations of the agents. The performance measure
we use here is based on the minimax regret solution criterion, which, informally, for a given
objective function, S, is an outcome that has the “best worst case”, or one that induces the least
amount of regret after one realizes the true input.1 More formally, if P = [0, B] denotes the set
of all points where a facility can be located and I = [a1, b1]× · · · × [an, bn] denotes the set of all
the possible vectors that correspond to the true ideal locations of the agents, then the minimax
optimal solution, popt, for some objective function S (like the sum of costs or the maximum cost)
is given by
popt = argmin
p∈P
max
I∈I
(
S(I, p)− min
p′∈P
S(I, p′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
maxRegret(p, I)
,
where S(I, p) denotes the value of S when evaluated with respect to I ∈ I and a point p.
Thus, our aim is to design mechanisms that approximately implement the optimal minimax
value (i.e., maxRegret(popt,I)) w.r.t. two objective functions—average cost and maximum cost—
and under two solution concepts—very weak dominance and minimax dominance—that naturally
extend to our setting (see Section 2 for definitions). In particular, we focus on deterministic and
anonymous mechanisms that additively approximate the optimal minimax value, and our results
are summarized in Table 1.
Before we move on to the rest of the paper, we anticipate that a reader might have some
questions, especially w.r.t. our choice of performance measure and our decision to use additive
as opposed to multiplicative approximations. We try to preemptively address these briefly in the
section below.
1We refer the reader to appendix A.1 for a discussion on the choice of regret as the performance measure.
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Average cost Maximum cost
Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound
very weak
dominance
B
2
B
2
[Thm. 3]
B
2
B
2
[Thm. 9]
minimax
dominance
3δ
4
[Thm. 6]
δ
2
(only for mechanisms
with finite range)
[Thm. 8]
B
4 +
3δ
8
[Thm. 10]
B
4
[GT17, Thm. 5]
Table 1: Summary of our results. All the bounds are with respect to deterministic mechanisms.
1.1 Some Q & A.
Why regret? We argue below why this is a good measure by considering some alternatives.
1. Why not bound the ratio of the objective values of a) the outcome that is returned by the
mechanism and b) the optimal outcome for that input? This, for instance, is the approach
taken by Chiesa et al. [CMZ12]. In our case this is not a good measure because we can
quickly see that this ratio is always unbounded in the worst-case.
2. Why not find a bound X such that for all I ∈ I, S(I, p) − S(I, pI) ≤ X, where p is the
outcome of the mechanism and pI is the optimal solution associated with I? This, for
instance, is the approach taken by Chiesa et al. [CMZ14]. Technically, this is essentially
what we are doing when using max. regret. However, using regret is more informative
because if we make a statement of the form maxRegret(p, I)−maxRegret(popt, I) ≤ Y , then
this conveys two things: a) for any p′ there is at least one I ∈ I such that S(I, p′)−S(I, pI) ≥
Z, where Z = maxRegret(popt) (i.e. it gives us a sense on what is achievable at all—which
in turn can be thought of as a natural lower bound) and b) the point p chosen by the
mechanism is at most (Y + Z)-far from the optimal objective value for any I. Hence, to
convey these, we employ the notion of regret. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for a
slightly more elaborate discussion.
Why additive approximations? We use additive as opposed to multiplicative approximations
because one can see that when using the latter and w.r.t. the max. cost objective function both the
solution concepts that we consider in this paper—which we believe are natural ones to consider in
this setting—do not provide any insight into the problem as there are no bounded mechanisms.
Again, we refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for a more elaborate discussion.
1.2 Related work
There are two broad lines of research that are related to the topic of this paper. The first is,
naturally, the extensive literature that focuses on designing mechanisms in the context of the
facility location problem and the second is the work done in mechanism design which considers
settings where the agents do not completely specify their preferences. Below, beginning with the
latter, we describe some of the papers that are most relevant to our work.
Designing mechanisms with incomplete preferences. A disproportionate amount of
the work in mechanism design considers settings where the agents have complete information
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about their preferences. However, as one might expect, the issue of agents not specifying their
complete preferences has been considered in the mechanism design literature and the papers
that are most relevant to this paper are the series of papers by Chiesa, Micali, and Zhu [CMZ12;
CMZ14; CMZ15], and the works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b]. Below we briefly discuss
about each of them.
The series of papers by Chiesa et al. [CMZ12; CMZ14; CMZ15] considers settings where the
agents are uncertain about their own types and they look at this model in the context of auctions.
In particular, in their setting the only information agents have about their valuations is that it
is contained in a set K, where K is any subset of the set of all possible valuations.2 Under
this setting, Chiesa et al. [CMZ12] look at single-item auctions and they provide several results
on the fraction of maximum social welfare that can be achieved under implementation in very
weakly dominant and undominated strategies; subsequently, Chiesa et al. [CMZ14] study the
performance of VCG mechanisms in the context of combinatorial auctions when the agents are
uncertain about their own types and under undominated and regret-minimizing strategies; and
finally, Chiesa et al. [CMZ15] analyze the Vickrey mechanism in the context of multi-unit auctions
and, again, when the agents are uncertain about their types, and in this case they essentially
show that it achieves near-optimal performance (in terms of social welfare) under implementation
in undominated strategies. The partial information model that we use in this paper is inspired by
this series of papers. In particular, our prior-free and absolute worst-case approach under partial
information is similar to the one taken by Chiesa et al. [CMZ12; CMZ14; CMZ15] (although such
absolute worst-case approaches are not uncommon and have been previously considered in many
different settings). However, our work is also different from theirs in that, unlike auctions, the
problem we consider falls within the domain of mechanism design without money and so their
results do not carry over to our setting.
The other set of papers that are most relevant to the broad theme here is the work of Hyafil
and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b] who considered the problem of designing mechanisms that have to
make decisions using partial type information. Their focus is again on contexts where payments
are allowed and in [HB07a] they mainly show that a class of mechanisms based on the minimax
regret solution criterion achieves approximate efficiency under approximate dominant strategy
implementation. In [HB07b] their focus is on automated mechanism design within the same
framework. While the overall theme in both their works is similar to ours, i.e., to look at issues
that arise when mechanisms only have access to partial information, the questions they are
concerned with and the model used are different. For instance, in the context of the models
used, whereas in ours and Chiesa et al.’s models the agents do not know their true types and
are therefore providing partial inputs, to the best of our understanding, the assumption in the
works of Hyafil and Boutilier [HB07a; HB07b] is that the mechanism has access to partial types,
but agents are aware of their true type. This subtle change in turn leads to the focus being on
solution concepts that are different from ours.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, note that another way to model uncertain agents
is to assume that each of them has a probability distribution which tells them the probability
of a point being their ideal location. For instance, this is the model that is used by Feige and
Tennenholtz [FT11] in the context of task scheduling. However, in our model the agents do not
have any more information than that they are within some interval, which we emphasize is not
2Chiesa et al. [CMZ14] argue that their model is equivalent to the Knightian uncertainty model that has received
much attention in decision theory (see related works section in [CMZ14] and the references therein). However, here
we do not use the term Knightian uncertainty, but instead just say that the agents are partially informed. This is
because, the notion we use here, which we believe is the natural one to consider in the context of our problem, is
less general than the notion of Knightian uncertainty.
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equivalent to assuming that, for a given agent, every point in the its interval is equally likely to
be its true ideal location.
Related work on the facility location problem. Starting with the work of Moulin
[Mou80] there has been a flurry of research looking at designing strategyproof mechanisms (i.e.,
mechanisms where it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for an agent to reveal her true preferences)
for the facility location problem. These can be broadly divided into two branches. The first one
consists of work, e.g., [Mou80; BJ94; SV02; MD11; DFMN12], that focuses on characterizing the
class of strategyproof mechanisms in different settings (see [Bar01] and [NRTV07, Chapter 10] for
a survey on some of these results). The second branch consists of more recent papers which fall
under the broad umbrella of approximate mechanism design without money, initially advocated by
Procaccia and Tennenholtz [PT13], that focus on looking at how well a strategyproof mechanism
can perform under different objective functions [PT13; LSWZ10; FW13; FT16; FSY16]. Our
paper, which tries to understand the performance of mechanisms under different solution concepts
and objective functions when the agents are partially informed about their own locations, falls
under this branch of the literature.
2 Preliminaries
Recall that in the standard (mechanism design) version of the facility location problem there are
n agents, denoted by the set [n] = {1, · · · , n}, and each agent i ∈ [n] has a true preferred3 location
ℓ∗i ∈ [0, B], for some fixed
4 constant B ∈ R. A vector I = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn), where ℓi ∈ [0, B], is referred
to as a location profile and the cost of agent i for a facility located at p is given by C(ℓ∗i , p) = |p−ℓ
∗
i |
(or equivalently, their utility is −|p−ℓ∗i |), the distance from the facility to the agent’s location.
5 In
general, the task in the facility location problem is to design mechanisms—which are, informally,
functions that map location profiles to a point (or a distribution over points) in [0, B]—that
(approximately) implement the outcome associated with a particular objective function.
In the version of the problem that we are considering, each agent i, although they have a true
location ℓ∗i ∈ [0, B], is currently unaware of their true location and instead only knows an interval
[ai, bi] ⊆ [0, B] such that ℓ
∗
i ∈ [ai, bi]. The interval [ai, bi], which we denote by Ki, is referred to
as the candidate locations of agent i, and we use Ki to denote the set of all possible candidate
locations of agent i (succinctly referred to as the set of candidate locations). Now, given a profile
of the set of candidate locations (K1, · · · ,Kn), we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (δ-uncertain-facility-location-game). For all n ≥ 1, B > 0, and δ ∈ [0, B], a profile
of the set of candidate locations (K1, · · · ,Kn) is said to induce a δ-uncertain-facility-location-
game if, for each i, Ki = {[ai, bi] | bi− ai ≤ δ and [ai, bi] ⊆ [0, B]} (or in words, for each agent i,
their set of candidate locations can only have intervals of length at most δ).
Remark: We refer to δ as the inaccuracy parameter. In general, when proving lower bounds
we assume that the designer knows this δ as this only makes our results stronger, whereas for
positive results we explicitly state what the designer knows about δ. Additionally, note that in
the definition above if δ = 0, then we have the standard facility location setting where the set
3We often omit the term “preferred” and instead just say that ℓ∗i is agent i’s location.
4Note that here we make the assumption that the domain under consideration is bounded instead of assuming
that the agents can be anywhere on the real line. This is necessary only because we are focusing on additive
approximations instead of the usual multiplicative approximations. (For a slightly more elaborate explanation, see
the introduction section of the paper by Golomb and Tzamos [GT17].)
5This particular utility function that is considered here is equivalent to the notion of symmetric single-peaked
preferences that is often used in the economics literature (see, e.g., [MD11]).
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of candidate locations associated with every agent is just a set of points in [0, B]. For a given
profile of candidate locations (K1, · · · ,Kn), we say that “the reports are exact” when, for each
agent i, Ki is a single point and not an interval.
2.1 Mechanisms, solution concepts, and implementation
A (deterministic) mechanism M = (X,F ) in our setting consists of an action space X =
(X1, · · · ,Xn), where Xi is the action space associated with agent i, and an outcome function
F which maps a profile of actions to an outcome in [0, B] (i.e., F : X1 × · · · ×Xn → [0, B]). A
mechanism is said to be direct if, for all i, Xi = Ki, where Ki is the set of all possible candidate
locations of agent i. For every agent i, a strategy is a function si : Ki → Xi, and we use Σi and
∆(Σi) to respectively denote the set of all pure and mixed strategies of agent i.
Since the outcome of a mechanism needs to be achieved in equilibrium, it remains to be
defined what equilibrium solution concepts we consider in this paper. Below we define, in the
order of their relative strengths, the two solution concepts that we use here. We note that the
first (very weak dominance) was also used by Chiesa et al. [CMZ12].
Definition 2 (very weak dominance). In a mechanism M = (X,F ), an agent i with candidate
locations Ki has a very weakly dominant strategy si ∈ Σi if ∀s
′
i ∈ Σi,∀ℓi ∈ Ki, and ∀s−i ∈ Σ−i,
C (ℓi, F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i))) ≤ C
(
ℓi, F (s
′
i(Ki), s−i(K−i))
)
.
In words, the above definition implies that for agent i with candidate locations Ki, it is always
best for i to play the strategy si, irrespective of the actions of the other players and irrespective
of which of the points in Ki is her true location.
Definition 3 (minimax dominance). In a mechanism M = (X,F ), an agent i with candidate
locations Ki has a minimax dominant strategy si ∈ Σi if ∀s
′
i ∈ Σi and ∀s−i ∈ Σ−i,
max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i))−C(ℓi, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i)))
≤ max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, F (s
′
i(Ki), s−i(K−i))− C(ℓi, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i)).
Before we explain what the definition above implies, let p = F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i)) be the
outcome of the mechanism when agent i plays strategy si and all the others play some s−i. Now,
let us consider the term
maxRegreti(p) = max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, p)− C(ℓi, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i))), (1)
which calculates agent i’s maximum regret (i.e., the absolute worst case loss agent i will experience
if and when she realizes her true location from her candidate locations) for playing si and hence
getting the output p. Then, what the above definition implies is that for a regret minimizing
agent i with candidate locations Ki, it is always best for i to play si, irrespective of the actions
of the other players, as any other strategy s′i results in an outcome p
′ with respect to which agent
i experiences at least as much maximum regret as she experiences with p.
Remark: Note that both the solution concepts defined above can be seen as natural exten-
sions of the classical (i.e., the usual mechanism design setting where the agents know their types
exactly) weak dominance notion to our setting. That is, for all i ∈ [n], if Ki is a single point,
then both of them collapse to the classical weak dominance notion.
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As stated in the introduction, given a profile of candidate locations (K1, · · · ,Kn), we want
the mechanism to “perform well” against all the possible underlying true locations of the agents,
i.e., with respect to all the location profiles I = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn) where ℓi ∈ Ki. Hence, for a given
objective function S, we aim to design mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the
optimal minimax value, which, for I = K1 × · · · ×Kn, is denoted by OMVS(I) and is defined as
OMVS(I) = maxRegret(popt,I), (2)
where for a point p ∈ [0, B], if S(I, p) denotes the value of the function S when evaluated with
respect to the vector I and a point p, then the maximum regret associated with p for the instance
I is defined as
maxRegret(p,I) = max
I∈I
(
S(I, p)− min
p′∈[0,B]
S(I, p′)
)
, (3)
and
popt = argmin
p∈[0,B]
maxRegret(p,I). (4)
Throughout, we refer to the point popt as the optimal minimax solution for the instance I.
Finally, now that we have our performance measure, we define implementation in very weakly
dominant and minimax dominant strategies.
Definition 4 (Implementation in very weakly dominant (minimax dominant) strategies). For a
δ-uncertain-facility-location-game, we say that a mechanism M = (X,F ) implements α-OMVS,
for some α ≥ 0 and some objective function S, in very weakly dominant (minimax dominant)
strategies, if for some s = (s1, · · · , sn), where si is a very weakly dominant (minimax dominant)
strategy for agent i with candidate locations Ki,
maxRegret(F (s1(K1), · · · sn(Kn)),I)−OMVS(I) ≤ α.
3 Implementing the average cost objective
In this section we consider the objective of locating a facility so as to minimize the average cost
(sometimes succinctly referred to as avgCost and written as AC). While the standard objective
in the facility location setting is to minimize the sum of costs, here, like in work of Golomb and
Tzamos [GT17], we use average cost because since we are approximating additively, it is easy to
see that in many cases a deviation from the optimal solution results in a factor of order n coming
up in the approximation bound. Hence, to avoid this, and to make comparisons with our second
objective function, maximum cost, easier we use average cost.
In the standard setting where the agents know their true location, the average cost of locating
a facility at a point p is defined as 1n
∑
i∈[n]C(xi, p), where xi is the location of agent i. Designing
even optimal strategyproof/truthful mechanisms in this case is easy since one can quickly see
that the optimal location for the facility is the median of x1, · · · , xn and returning the same
is strategyproof. Note that, for some k ≥ 0, when n = 2k + 1, the median is unique and is
the (k + 1)-th largest element. However, when n = 2k, the “median” can be defined as any
point between (and including) the (n/2)-th and ((n/2) + 1)-th largest numbers. As a matter of
convention, here we consider the (n/2 + 1)-th element to be the median. Hence, throughout, we
always write that the median element is the (k + 1)-th element, where k = ⌊n⌋2 .
In contrast to the standard setting, for some δ ∈ (0, B] and a corresponding δ-uncertain-
facility-location-game, even computing what the minimax optimal solution for the average cost
objective (see Equation 4) is is non-trivial, let alone seeing if it can be implemented with any
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of the solution concepts discussed in Section 2.1. Therefore, we start by stating some properties
about the minimax optimal solution that will be useful when designing mechanisms. A complete
discussion on how to find the minimax optimal solution when using the average cost objective,
as well as the proofs for the lemmas stated in the next section, are in Appendix D.
3.1 Properties of the minimax optimal solution for avgCost
Given the candidate locations Ki = [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi − ai ≤ δ,
consider the left endpoints associated with all the agents, i.e., the set {ai}i∈[n]. We denote
the sorted order of these points as L1, · · · , Ln (throughout, by sorted order we mean sorted in
non-decreasing order). Similarly, we denote the sorted order of the right endpoints, i.e., the
points in the set {bi}i∈[n], as R1, · · · , Rn. Next, we state the following lemma which gives a
succinct formula for the maximum regret associated with a point p (i.e., maxRegret(p,I), where
I = [a1, b1] × · · · × [an, bn]; see Equation 3). As stated above, all the proofs for lemmas in the
section appear in Appendix D.
Lemma 1. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the average cost objective
can be written as max(objAC1 (p), obj
AC
2 (p)), where
• objAC1 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑k
i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index such
that Rj > p and j ≤ k
• objAC2 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑h
i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p − Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index such
that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2.
Our next lemma states that the minimax optimal solution, popt, associated with the avgCost
objective function is always in the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Lemma 2. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the avgCost objective function,
then popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Equipped with these properties, we are now ready to talk about implementation using the
solution concepts defined in Section 2.1.
3.2 Implementation in very weakly dominant strategies
As discussed in Section 2.1, the strongest solution concept that we consider is very weak domi-
nance, where for an agent i, with candidate locations Ki, strategy si is very weakly dominant if
it is always best for i to play si, irrespective of the actions of the other players and irrespective
of which of the points in Ki is her true location. While it is indeed a natural solution concept
which extends the classical notion of weak dominance, we will see below in, Theorem 3, that it
is too strong as no deterministic mechanism can achieve a better approximation bound than B2 .
This in turn implies that, among deterministic mechanisms, the naive mechanism which always,
irrespective of the reports of the agents, outputs the point B2 is the best one can do.
Theorem 3. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], let M = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that implements
α-OMVAC in very weakly dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then,
α ≥ B2 .
Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that α = B2 − γ for some γ > 0. First, note
that here we can restrict ourselves to direct mechanisms since Chiesa et al. showed that the
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revelation principle holds with respect to this solution concept [CMZ14, Lemma A.2]. So, now,
let us consider a scenario where the profile of true candidate locations of the agents are ([a1, b1],
· · · , [an, bn]) and let F ([a1, b1], · · · , [an, bn]) = p. Since reporting the true candidate locations is
a very weakly dominant strategy in M, this implies that for an agent i and for all ℓ ∈ [ai, bi],
|ℓ− p| ≤ |ℓ− p′|, (5)
where for some [a′i, b
′
i] 6= [ai, bi], p
′ = F ([a1, b1], · · · , [a
′
i, b
′
i], · · · , [an, bn]).
Next, consider the profile of true candidate locations ([a1, b1], · · · , [a
′
i, b
′
i], · · · , [an, bn]). Then,
again, using the fact that reporting the truth is a very weakly dominant strategy, we have that
for agent i and for all ℓ′ ∈ [a′i, b
′
i],
|ℓ′ − p′| ≤ |ℓ′ − p|. (6)
Equations 5 and 6 together imply that for a k ∈ [ai, bi] ∩ [a
′
i, b
′
i],
|k − p| = |k − p′|. (7)
So, if Q = [ai, bi] ∩ [a
′
i, b
′
i] and |Q| > 1, then Equation 7 implies that p = p
′.
Now, let us consider F ([a1, b1], · · · , [a1, b1]), where a1 = 0 and b1 = ǫ, and let F ([a1, b1], · · · ,
[a1, b1]) = p. By repeatedly using the observation made above, we have that for δ ∈ (0, B],
ǫ ∈ (0,min{δ, γ}), ǫ1 ∈ (0, ǫ), and bi = ǫ+ i(δ − ǫ1),
p = F ([a1, b1], · · · , [a1, b1]) = F ([b1 − ǫ1, b2], [a1, b1], · · · , [a1, b1])
= F ([b2 − ǫ1, b3], [a1, b1], · · · , [a1, b1]) = · · · = F ([B − ǫ1, B], [a1, b1], · · · , [a1, b1]) = · · ·
= F ([B − ǫ1, B], · · · , [B − ǫ1, B]). (8)
Next, it is easy to see that the minimax optimal solution associated with the profile ([a1, b1],
· · · , [a1, b1]) is
a1+b1
2 =
ǫ
2 , whereas for the profile ([B−ǫ1, B], · · · , [B−ǫ1, B]) it isB−
ǫ1
2 . Also, from
Equation 8 we know that M outputs the same point p for both these profiles. So, if we assume
without loss of generality that p ≤ B+ǫ/2−ǫ1/22 , this implies that for I = [B−ǫ1, B]×· · ·×[B−ǫ1, B],
α ≥ maxRegret(p,I)−OMVAC(I)
≥ regret(p, (B, · · · , B))−OMVAC(I)
≥ (B/2− ǫ/4 + ǫ1/4) − ǫ1/2
≥ B/2− ǫ
> B/2− γ.
This in turn contradicts our assumption that α = B2 − γ.
Although one could argue that this result is somewhat expected given how Chiesa et al. also
observed similar poor performance for implementation with very weakly dominant strategies in
the context of the single-item auctions [CMZ12, Theorem 1], we believe that it is still interesting
because not only do we observe a similar result in a setting that is considerably different from
theirs, but this observation also reinforces their view that one would likely have to look beyond
very weakly dominant strategies in settings like ours. This brings us to our next section, where
we consider an alternative, albeit weaker, but natural, extension to the classical notion of weakly
dominant strategies.
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3.3 Implementation in minimax dominant strategies
In this section we move our focus to implementation in minimax dominant strategies and explore
whether by using this weaker solution concept one can obtain a better approximation bound
than the one obtained in the previous section. To this end, we first present a general result
that applies to all mechanisms in our setting that are anonymous and minimax dominant, in
particular showing that any such mechanism cannot be onto. Following this, we look at non-onto
mechanisms and here we provide a mechanism that achieves a much better approximation bound
than the one we observed when considering implementation in very weak dominant strategies.
Remark: Note that in this section we focus only on direct mechanisms. This is without loss
of generality because, like in the case with very weakly dominant strategies, it turns out that the
revelation principle holds in our setting for minimax dominant strategies. A proof of the same
can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], letM = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that is anonymous
and minimax dominant for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then, M cannot be onto.
Proof. Suppose this were not the case and there existed a deterministic mechanism M that is
anonymous, minimax dominant, and onto. First, note that if we restrict ourselves to profiles
where every agent’s report is a single point (instead of intervals as in our setting), then M must
have n − 1 fixed points y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yn−1 such that for any profile of single reports (x1, · · · , xn),
M(x1, · · · , xn) = median(y1, · · · , yn−1, x1, · · · , xn). This is so because, given the fact that M is
anonymous, onto, and minimax dominant in our setting, when restricted to the setting where
reports are single points, M is strategyproof, anonymous, and onto, and hence we know from
the characterization result by Masso´ and De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] that every such mech-
anism must have n − 1 fixed points y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yn−1 such that for any profile (x1, · · · , xn),
M(x1, · · · , xn) = median(y1, · · · , yn−1, p1, · · · , pn), where pi is the most preferred alternative of
agent i (i.e., agent i’s peak; since the utility of agent i for an alternative a ∈ [0, B] is defined
as -|xi − a|, we know that the preferences of agent i is symmetric single-peaked with the peak
pi = xi).
6,7
Now, given the observation above, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, let us consider the smallest j such that
yj 6= yj+1 (if there is no such j define j = n − 1 if yn−1 6= B and j = 0 otherwise) and consider
the following input profile L0 
 yj, · · · , yj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−j−1 agents
[ℓ, r], z, B, · · · , B︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−1 agents

 ,
where yj < ℓ < r < yj+1, r − ℓ < δ, z =
ℓ+r
2 − ǫ and 0 < ǫ <
r−ℓ
2 .
In the profile L0, let a and b denote the agents who report [ℓ, r] and z, respectively, and
let p0 = M(L0). First, note that if L1 denotes the profile where agent a reports ℓ instead of
[ℓ, r] and every other agent reports as in L0, then p1 = M(L1) = median(y1, · · · , yn−1, yj , · · · ,
yj, ℓ, z,B, · · ·B) = ℓ. Also, if L2 denotes the profile where agent a reports r instead of [ℓ, r]
6The original statement by Masso´ and De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] talks about mechanisms that are
anonymous, strategyproof, and efficient. However, it is known that for strategyproof mechanisms in (symmetric)
single-peaked domains, efficiency is equivalent to being onto (see, e.g., [NRTV07, Lemma 10.1] for a proof).
7It is worth noting that the characterization result by Masso´ and De Barreda [MD11, Corollary 2] for mech-
anisms that are anonymous, stratgeyproof, and onto under symmetric single-peaked preferences is the same as
Moulin’s characterization of the set of such mechanisms on the general single-peaked domain [Mou80, Theorem
1]).
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Input: a δ ≥ 0 and for each agent i, their input interval [ai, bi]
Output: location of the facility p
1: A← {g1, g2, · · · , gk}, where g1 = 0, gk ≤ B, and gi+1 − gi =
δ
2
2: for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n} do
3: xi ← point closest to ai in A (in case of a tie, break in favour of the point in [ai, bi] if there exists one,
break in favour of point to the left otherwise)
4: yi ← point closest to bi in A (break ties as in line 3)
5: if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 1 then ⊲ the case when xi = yi
6: ℓi ← x
7: else if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 2 then
8: if |[xi, yi] ∩ [ai, bi]| < 2 then
9: if ai + bi ≤ xi + yi then
10: ℓi ← xi
11: else
12: ℓi ← yi
13: end if
14: else
15: ℓi ← xi
16: end if
17: else if |[xi, yi] ∩A| == 3 then
18: ℓi ← zi, where zi is the point in [xi, yi] ∩A that is neither xi nor yi
19: end if
20: end for
21: return median(ℓ1, · · · , ℓn)
Algorithm 1: δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism
and every other agent reports as in L0, then p2 = M(L2) = median(y1, · · · , yn−1, yj, · · · , yj, r,
z,B, · · ·B) = z. Now, since p1 = ℓ and p2 = z, this implies that p0 =
ℓ+z
2 , for if otherwise
agent a can deviate from L0 by reporting
ℓ+z
2 instead (it is easy to see that this reduces agent a’s
maximum regret), thus violating the fact that M is minimax dominant. Given this, consider the
profile L3 which is the same as L0 except for the fact that agent b reports (2z−ℓ) instead of z. By
again using the same line of reasoning as in the case of L0, it is easy to see that p3 =M(L3) = z.
However, this in turn implies that agent b can deviate from L0 to L3, thus again violating the
fact that M is minimax dominant.
Given the fact that we cannot have an anonymous, minimax dominant, and onto mechanism,
the natural question to consider is if we can find non-onto mechanisms that perform well. We
answer this question in the next section.
3.3.1 Non-onto mechanisms
In this section we consider non-onto mechanisms. We first show a positive result by presenting an
anonymous mechanism that implements 3δ4 -OMVAC in minimax dominant strategies. Following
this, we present a conditional lower bound that shows that one cannot achieve an approximation
bound better than δ2 when considering mechanisms that have a finite range.
An anonymous and minimax dominant mechanism. Consider the δ2 -equispaced-median
mechanism defined in Algorithm 1, which can be thought of as an extension to the standard
median mechanism. The key assumption in this mechanism is that the designer knows a δ such
that any agent’s candidate locations has a length at most δ. Given this δ, the key idea is to divide
the interval [0, B] into a set of “grid points” and then map every profile of reports to one of these
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points, while at the same time ensuring that the mapping is minimax dominant. In particular, in
the case of the δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism, when δ > 0, its range is restricted to the finite
set of points A = {g1, g2, · · · gm} such that, for i ≥ 1, gi+1 − gi =
δ
2 , g1 = 0, and gm ≤ B.
Below we first prove a lemma where we show that the δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism is
minimax dominant. Subsequently, we then use this to prove our main theorem which shows that
the δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism implements
3δ
4 -OMVAC in minimax dominant strategies.
Lemma 5. Given a δ ∈ [0, B] and for every agent i in a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game,
reporting the candidate locations [ai, bi] is a minimax dominant strategy for agent i in the
δ
2-
equispaced-median mechanism.
Proof. Let us fix an agent i and let [ai, bi] be her candidate locations. Also, let L0 be some
arbitrary profile of candidate locations, where L0 = ([a1, b1], · · · , [an, bn]). We need to show
that it is minimax dominant for agent i to report [ai, bi] in the
δ
2 -equispaced-median mechanism
(denoted byM from now on), and for this we broadly consider the following two cases. Intuitively,
in both cases what we try to argue is that for an agent i with candidate locations [ai, bi] the ℓi
that is associated with i in the mechanism is in fact the agent’s “best alternative” among the
alternatives in A (see line 1 in Algorithm 1).
Case 1: ai = bi. In this case, we show that it is a very weakly dominant strategy for agent
i to report ai. To see this, let p be the output of M when agent i reports ai and xi be the point
that is closest to ai in A (with ties broken in favour of the point which is to the left of ai). From
line 6 in the mechanism, we know that ℓi = xi. Now, if either ℓi < p or ℓi > p, then any report
that changes the median will only result in the output being further away from agent i. And
if ℓi = p, then since we choose ℓi to be the point that is closest to ai in A, it is clear that it is
very weakly dominant for the agent to report ai. Hence, from both the cases above, we have our
claim.
Case 2: ai 6= bi. Let p be the output of M when agent i reports [ai, bi], and let xi and yi
be the points that are closest (with ties being broken in favour of points in [ai, bi] in both cases)
to ai and bi, respectively. From the mechanism we can see that ℓi ∈ [xi, yi]. Next, let us first
consider the case when p < xi or p > yi. In both these cases, given the fact that xi and yi are
the points closest to ai and bi, respectively, p has to be outside [ai, bi]. And so, if this is the case,
then if agent i misreports and the output changes to some p′ < p or p′ > p, in both cases, it is
easy to see that the maximum regret associated with p′ is greater than the one associated with
p. Hence, the only case where an agent i can successfully misreport is if p ∈ [xi, yi]. So, we focus
on this scenario below.
Considering the scenario when p ∈ [xi, yi], first, note that the interval [xi, yi] can have at most
three points that are also in A (this is proved in Claim 4, which is in Appendix C). So, given
this, let us now consider the following cases.
i) |[xi, yi] ∩A| = 1. Since p ∈ [xi, yi], this implies that p = xi = ℓi. Therefore, in this case,
if agent i misreports, then she only experiences a greater maximum regret as the resulting
output p′ would be outside [xi, yi] and we know from our discussion above that these points
have a greater maximum regret than a point in [xi, yi].
ii) |[xi, yi] ∩A| = 2. First, note that since p ∈ [xi, yi] and the only other point in [xi, yi] that
is also in A is yi, if p < ℓi or p > ℓi, then agent i can only increase her maximum regret by
misreporting and changing the outcome (because the new outcome will be outside [xi, yi]).
Therefore, we only need to consider the case when p = ℓi, and here we consider the following
sub-cases.
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(a) p = ℓi = xi. From the mechanism we know that this happens only when either both
xi and yi are in [ai, bi] (lines 14-15) or when ai + bi ≤ xi + yi (lines 9-10). Now, since
we know that every point outside [xi, yi] is worse in terms of maximum regret than xi
or yi, we only need to consider the case when agent i misreports in such a way that
it results in the new outcome p′ being equal to yi. And below we show that under
both the conditions stated above (lines 9-10 and 14-15, both of which result in ℓi being
defined as being equal to xi in the mechanism) the maximum regret associated with
yi is at least as much as the one associated with xi.
To see this, consider the profile where agent i reports ai instead of [ai, bi] and all the
other agents’ reports are the same as in L0. Let pa be the output of M for this profile.
Note that pa = xi since the ℓi associated with agent i in this profile is xi and so the
outcome in this profile is the same as p = xi. Similarly, let pb be the outcome when
agent i reports bi instead of [ai, bi]. Since the ℓi associated with agent i in this profile
is yi, one can see that xi ≤ pb ≤ yi. Now, if pb = xi, then maxRegreti(xi) = 0, where
maxRegreti(xi) is the maximum regret associated with the point xi for agent i (see
Equation 1 for the definition), and so xi is definitely better than yi. Therefore, we
can ignore this case and instead assume that pb = yi. So, considering this, since for
the maximum regret calculations only the endpoints ai and bi matter (this is proved
in Claim 5), we have that
maxRegreti(yi) = max{|ai − yi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − yi| − |bi − pb|}
= |ai − yi| − |ai − pa| (since pb = yi and pa = xi)
≥ |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|
(depending on the case, use either the fact that xi, yi ∈ [ai, bi] or that ai + bi ≤ xi + yi)
= maxRegreti(xi). (since pb = yi and pa = xi)
Hence, we see that in this case agent i cannot gain by misreporting.
(b) p = ℓi = yi. We can show that in this case maxRegret(xi) ≥ maxRegret(yi) by
proceeding similarly as in the case above.
iii) |[xi, yi] ∩A| = 3. Let xi < zi < yi be the three points in [xi, yi] ∩ A. Since the length of
[ai, bi] is at most δ, note that both xi and yi cannot be in the interval (ai, bi). So below
we assume without loss of generality that xi ≤ ai. From the mechanism we know that in
this case ℓi = zi (line 18). Also, as in the cases above, note that if p < ℓi or p > ℓi, then
agent i can only increase her maximum regret by misreporting and changing the outcome
(because, again, the new outcome will be outside [xi, yi]). Therefore, the only case we need
to consider is if p = ℓi, and for this case we show that both xi and yi have a maximum
regret that is at least as much as that associated with zi (we do not need to consider points
outside [xi, yi] since we know that these points have a worse maximum regret than any of
the points in [xi, yi]). Note that if this is true, then we are done as this shows that agent i
cannot benefit from misreporting.
To see why the claim is true, consider the profile where agent i reports ai instead of [ai, bi]
and all the other agents’ reports are the same as in L0. Let pa be the outcome of M for
this profile. Similarly, let pb be the outcome when agent i reports bi instead of [ai, bi]. Note
that pa ≤ p = zi and pb ≥ p = zi. Now, since, again, for the maximum regret calculations
only the endpoints ai and bi matter (this is proved in Claim 5, which is in Appendix C),
we have that
maxRegret(zi) = max{|ai − zi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − zi| − |bi − pb|}
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≤ |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|
(since xi is the closest point to ai in A and using very weak dominance for single reports)
= max{|ai − xi| − |ai − pa| , |bi − xi| − |bi − pb|}
(since xi ≤ ai and |bi − pb| ≤ |bi − pa| by very weak dominance for single reports)
= maxRegret(xi).
Similarly, we can show that maxRegret(zi) ≤ maxRegret(yi). Hence, agent i will not derive
any benefit from misreporting her candidate locations.
Finally, combining all the cases above, we have that the δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism is
minimax dominant. This concludes the proof of our lemma.
Given the lemma above, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given a δ ∈ [0, B], the δ2-equispaced-median mechanism is anonymous and imple-
ments 3δ4 -OMVAC in minimax dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game.
Proof. From Lemma 5 we know that the mechanism is minimax dominant. Therefore, the only
thing left to show is that it achieves an approximation bound of 3δ4 . In order to do this, consider an
arbitrary profile of candidate locations L0, where L0 = ([a1, b1], · · · , [an, bn]), and let L1, · · · , Ln
and R1, · · · , Rn denote the sorted order of the left endpoints (i.e., {ai}i∈[n]) and right endpoints
(i.e., {bi}i∈[n]), respectively. Next, consider the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1] that is associated with the
given profile L0, where k =
⌊n⌋
2 and Lk+1 and Rk+1 are the medians of the sets {ai}i∈[n] and
{bi}i∈[n], respectively. (Note that Rk+1−Lk+1 ≤ δ from Claim 1, which is in Appendix C.) Also,
let i be an agent who reported an ai such that ai = Lk+1 and j denote one who reported a bi
such that bi = Rk+1. Next, from the mechanism, consider xi (see line 3) and yj (see line 4).
First, for every agent c with bc ≤ Rk+1 (and there are k + 1 of them), ℓc ≤ yj. This is so
because, for every agent c, the point ℓc that is associated with the agent is in [xc, yc] and also for
two agents c, c′, if bc′ ≤ bc, then yc′ ≤ yc. Similarly, for every agent d with ad ≥ Lk+1 (and, again,
there are k + 1 of them), ℓd ≥ xi. Hence, it follows from the two observations above that the
output p of the mechanism, which is the median of {ℓ1, · · · , ℓn}, will be in the interval [xi, yj].
Second, we will show that if |[xi, yj ] ∩A| = 3, then the output p of the mechanism will be the
point z in interval (xi, yj) such that z ∈ A. To see this, consider the points R1, · · · , Rk+1 and
consider the largest q, where q ≤ k, such that Rq ≤ z (define q = 0, if R1 > z). We will assume
without of loss of generality that, for each i, the agent associated with Ri (i.e., one who reports
a right endpoint such that it is equal to Ri) is agent i. Now, for each agent r from 1 to q, the ℓr
associated with them in the mechanism is at most z. This is so because, for each such agent r
the yr associated with them at most z. Also, for each agent s from q + 1 to k + 1, the only way
the ℓs associated with agent s is greater than z is if the left endpoints associated with them are
greater than Lk+1 (because if not, then one can see that the [xs, ys] associated with agent s has
xi and z in it and so ℓs cannot be greater than z). Now, let n1 be the number of agents among
the agents from q + 1 to k + 1 such that their left endpoints are greater than Lk+1. This implies
that there are n1 agents among the ones that report a left endpoint in {L1, · · · , Lk+1} that have
a corresponding right endpoint greater than or equal to Rk+1. And this in turn implies that the
ℓs associated with these n1 agents can be at most z (because, again, one can see that the [x, y]
associated with such an agent will have xi and z in it). Hence, combining all the observations
above, we see that q+ ((k+1− (q+1)+ 1)−n1)+n1 = k+1 agents report an ℓ that is at most
z. Now, we can employ a similar line of reasoning to show that k + 1 agents report an ℓ that is
at least z. Hence, it follows that the median of {ℓ1, · · · , ℓn} must be z.
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Given the observations above, let us now look at the following cases. In all the cases we show
that any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is at a distance of at most
3δ
4 from p, the output of the mechanism.
Case 1: both xi and yj are not in [Lk+1, Rk+1]. In this case, let us consider the following
sub cases.
a) |[xi, yj] ∩A| = 2. Since both xi and yj are not in [Lk+1, Rk+1] and there is no other point
in A that is in [Lk+1, Rk+1], we have that the distance from any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] to
either xi or yj is at most
δ
2 (as the distance between xi or yj is
δ
2). Also, from the discussion
above we know that the median that is returned by the mechanism is either xi or yj, so we
have our bound.
b) |[xi, yj] ∩A| = 3. In this case we know from above that the output of the mechanism p = z,
where z ∈ [xi, yj ] ∩ A and is neither xi nor yj. Therefore, we have that (z − Lk+1) ≤
(z−xi) =
δ
2 , and (Rk+1− z) < (yj − z) =
δ
2 . Hence, any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance
of at most δ2 from p.
c) |[xi, yj] ∩A| > 3. Since for any interval [a, b] of length at most δ, the [x, y] associated with
it can have at most three points in A (this is proved in Claim 4, which is in Appendix C),
where x and y are as defined in the mechanism (see lines 3-4), this case is impossible.
Case 2: at least one of xi or yj is in [Lk+1, Rk+1]. Let us assume without loss of generality
that xi is the point in [Lk+1, Rk+1], and let us consider the following sub cases.
a) |[xi, yj] ∩A| = 2. In this case, if the output of the mechanism p = xi, then we have
that (xi − Lk+1) ≤
δ
4 (since, by definition, xi is the point in A that is closest to Lk+1),
and (Rk+1 − xi) ≤ |Rk+1 − yj| + (yj − xi) ≤
δ
4 +
δ
2 (since, by definition, yj is the point
in A that is closest to Rk+1). Hence, any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance of at most
3δ
4 from p. On other hand, if the output of the mechanism p = yj, then we have that
(yj − Lk+1) = (yj − xi + xi − Lk+1) ≤
δ
2 +
δ
4 (since xi is the point in A that is closest to
Lk+1), and |yj−Rk+1| ≤
δ
4 (since yj is the point in A that is closest to Rk+1). Hence, when
p = yj, any point in [Lk+1, Rk+1] is a distance of at most
3δ
4 from p. Combining the two,
we see that our claim is true in this case.
b) |[xi, yj] ∩A| = 3. Here again since p = z, where z ∈ [xi, yj] ∩ A and is neither xi nor yj,
we have that (z − Lk+1) ≤ (z − xi + xi − Lk+1) ≤
δ
2 +
δ
4 (since xi is the point in A that
is closest to Lk+1), and (Rk+1 − z) ≤ (yj − z) ≤
δ
2 . Hence, even in this case, any point in
[Lk+1, Rk+1] is at a distance of at most
3δ
4 from p.
Finally, since the output of the mechanism is a distance of at most 3δ4 from any point in
[Lk+1, Rk+1], and given the fact that the minimax optimal solution is in [Lk+1, Rk+1] (from
Lemma 2), one can see using Lemma 1 that for I = [a1, b1] × · · · × [an, bn], maxRegret(p,I) −
OMVAC(I) is also bounded by
3δ
4 (this is proved in Claim 6, which is in Appendix C).
A conditional lower bound. In the context of our motivating example from the introduction,
it is possible, and in fact quite likely, that the city can only build the school at a finite set
of locations on the street. Therefore, an interesting class of non-onto mechanisms to consider
is ones which have a finite range. Furthermore, seeing our mechanism above, an inquisitive
reader might wonder: “why δ2 -equispaced? why not
δ
3 -equispaced or something smaller than
δ
2?” First, one can easily construct counter-examples to show that any ǫ-equispaced-median
mechanism is not minimax dominant for ǫ < δ2 . However, that still does not rule out mechanisms
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whose range is some finite set {g1, · · · , gm}. So, below we consider this question and we show
that the approximation bound associated with any mechanism that is anonymous, minimax
dominant, and has a finite range, is at least δ2 . The key idea that is required in order to show this
bound is the following lemma, which informally says that if the mechanism has a finite range,
is minimax dominant, and achieves a bound less than 3δ4 , then there is “sufficient-gap” between
four consecutive points in the range, A, of the mechanism. Once we have this observation it is
then in turn used to construct profiles that will result in the stated bound.
Lemma 7. Given a δ ∈ (0, B6 ], let M be a deterministic mechanism that has a finite range A
(of size at least six), is anonymous, and one that implements α-OMVAC in minimax dominant
strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then, either α ≥ 3δ4 , or there exists four
consecutive points g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ A such that g1 < g2 < g3 < g4 and
d1
2 + d2 +
d3
2 ≥ δ, where, for
i ∈ [3], di = gi+1 − gi.
Proof (sketch). The proof here is broadly similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in that here again we
use a characterization result by Masso´ and De Barreda [MD11], albeit a different one, and then
construct profiles in order to prove that the claim is true. The result we will rely on is the one that
characterizes the set of anonymous and strategyproof mechanisms in the symmetric single-peaked
domain [MD11, Corollary 1]. In particular, Masso´ and De Barreda showed that any mechanism
that is anonymous and strategyproof in the symmetric single-peaked domain can be described
as a ‘disturbed median’. We will not be defining disturbed medians precisely since the definition
is quite involved and we do not need it for the purposes of this paper, but broadly a mechanism
M′ is a disturbed median if i) it has n+ 1 fixed points 0 ≤ y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yn+1 ≤ 1, ii) its range has
a countable number of non-intersecting discontinuity intervals {[am, bm]}m∈M , where M is some
indexation set and where for all i, yi /∈ [am, bm] for all m ∈ M , iii) has a family of anonymous
tie-breaking rules, and iv) behaves the following way with respect to a profile (x1, · · · , xn) of
exact reports: if median(y1, · · · , yn+1, x1, · · · , xn) 6= dm for all m ∈M , where dm =
am+bm
2 , then
M′(x1, · · · , xn) = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, t1, · · · , tn), where ti is the most preferred alternative of
agent i in the range of M′.8
Given the partial description of disturbed medians mentioned above, let us consider the
mechanismM that is anonymous and minimax dominant. First, note that if we restrict ourselves
to profiles where every agent’s report is a single point (instead of intervals as in our setting), then
we know from the result of Masso´ and De Barreda that M must be a disturbed median [MD11,
Corollary 1]. Second, note that for each yi,M(yi, · · · , yi) = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, yi, · · · , yi) = yi.
Therefore, each yi belongs to A, the range ofM. Additionally, also note that y1 and yn+1 are the
minimum and maximum elements, respectively, in A, for if not then for a g ∈ A that is either less
than y1 or greater than yn+1, median(y1, · · · , yn+1, g, · · · , g) 6= g, which is impossible if g ∈ A
and M is minimax dominant.
Next, given the observations above, consider the following two cases.
Case 1: there exists at most 2 points in A that are greater than y2. In this case,
let us consider the points y1 and y2. If y2 − y1 ≥
3δ
2 , then consider the profile L0 where n − 1
agents report y1 and the last agent reports y2, i.e., L0 = (y1, · · · , y1, y2). Let p0 =M(L0). From
above we know that p0 = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, y1, · · · , y1, y2) = y2 (since y2 is the (n + 1)th
largest number). However, the minimax optimal solution associated with this profile is y1 and
now one can verify from the expressions in Lemma 1 that, for an appropriate choice of n, α ≥
8Note that we have only defined it for profiles which satisfy the property mentioned above since we will only
be using such profiles in this proof; the interested reader can refer to [MD11, Definition 7] for a complete definition
of disturbed medians.
16
maxRegret(p0,I) − OMVAC(I) ≥
3δ
4 , where I is the instance associated with the profile L0.
Hence, “the either part” of our lemma is true in this case.
On the other hand, if y2− y1 <
3δ
2 , then consider the case when there are two points g, g
′ ∈ A
such that y2 < g
′ < g and the three points are consecutive in A (the arguments below can be
easily modified when there is only one or zero points greater than y2). Note that if g
′−y2 ≥
3δ
2 or
g− g′ ≥ 3δ2 , then we can construct profiles like in the case above to show that α ≥
3δ
4 . Therefore,
let us assume that this is not the case. Now, this implies that if d1 = (y1 − 0) and d2 = (B − g),
then B−0 = B−g+g−y2+y2−y1+y1−0 < d2+
3δ
2 +
3δ
2 +
3δ
2 +d1. However, this in turn implies
that at least one of d1 or d2 is at least
B
2 −
9δ
4 ≥
3δ
4 . So, if we assume without loss of generality
that d1 ≥
3δ
4 , then we can consider the profile L0 where all the agents report 0 (note that by our
assumption on d1, 0 /∈ A, because if so, then since y1 is the minimum element in A, y1 should be
equal to 0), and let p1 = M(L1). Given the fact that p1 ≥ y1, this in turn implies that one can
verify from the expressions in Lemma 1 that α ≥ maxRegret(p1,I)−OMVAC(I) ≥
3δ
4 , where I
is the instance associated with the profile L1. Hence, again, “the either part” of our lemma is
true.
Case 2: there are at least 3 points in A that are greater than y2. In this case,
consider four consecutive points g1, g2, g3, g4 in A such that g1 ≥ y2 and g1 < g2 < g3 < g4. Also,
for i ∈ [3], let di denote the distance between the points gi and gi+1. Below we will show that
d1
2 + d2 +
d3
2 ≥ δ.
Now, to prove our claim, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that d12 + d2 +
d3
2 < δ.
Also, let us consider the largest j such that yj ≤ g1 (note that we have 2 ≤ j ≤ n), and let us
consider the following input profile L0
yj, · · · , yj,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−j agents
[ℓ, r], g3, B, · · · , B︸ ︷︷ ︸
j−2 agents

 ,
where ℓ = (g1+
d1
2 − γ1), r = (g3+
d3
2 + γ2), γ1+ γ2 < (δ− (
d1
2 + x2+
d3
2 )), γ1 < γ2, γ1 <
d1
2 , and
γ2 <
d3
2 .
Let p0 = M(L0) and let a and b be the agents who report [ℓ, r] and g3, respectively, in L0.
Next, consider the profile L1 where the only difference from L0 is that agent a reports ℓ here
instead of [ℓ, r], and let p1 =M(L1). Now, given the fact that g1, g2, g3, g4 are consecutive points
in A and g1 is the unique closest point to ℓ in A, we know that g1 is the most preferred alternative
of agent a in the range of M. Therefore, we have that p1 = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, yj , · · · , yj, g1,
g3, B, · · ·B) = g1 (since g1 is the (n+1)th largest number). Using a similar line of reasoning one
can see that if L2 denotes the profile where agent a reports r instead of [ℓ, r] and every other
agent reports as in L0, then p2 =M(L2) = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, yj, · · · , yj, g4, g3, B, · · ·B) = g3
(since here g3 is the (n+1)th largest number). Now, since p1 = g1 and p2 = g3, this implies that
p0 = g2, for if otherwise agent a can deviate from L0 by reporting g2 instead (it is easy to see that
this reduces agent a’s maximum regret), thus violating the fact that M is minimax dominant.
Given this, now consider the profile L3 which is the same as L0 except for the fact that agent
b reports g4 instead of g3. Here p3 = M(L3) has to be equal to g3 because one can see from
the max. regret calculations associated with agent a that a has a lesser maximum regret for g3
than for g2 (this is because of our choice of appropriate γ1 and γ2). So if p3 is not equal to g3,
then agent a can move from L3 to L4 where L4 is the same as L3 except for agent a reporting g3
instead of [ℓ, r] (and this would be beneficial for a since the output for L4 = median(y1, · · · , yn+1,
yj, · · · , yj, g3, g4, B, · · ·B) = g3). However, now if p3 = g3, then this implies that agent b can
deviate from L0 (which, as discussed above, has an output p0 = g2) to L3, thus again violating
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the fact that M is minimax dominant. Hence, for this case, we have that d12 + d2 +
d3
2 ≥ δ.
Finally, combining all the cases above, we have our lemma.
Given the lemma above, the proof of our lower bound is straightforward. (Note that below
we ignore mechanisms which have less than six points in their range as one can easily show that
such mechanisms perform poorly.)
Theorem 8. Given a δ ∈ (0, B6 ], let M be a deterministic mechanism that has a finite range
(of size at least six), is anonymous, and one that implements α-OMVAC in minimax dominant
strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then, for any ǫ > 0, α ≥ δ2 − ǫ.
Proof (sketch). Consider the mechanism M and let A denote its range. From Lemma 7 we
know that either α ≥ 3δ4 or there exists four consecutive points g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ A such that
g1 < g2 < g3 < g4 and
d1
2 + d2 +
d3
2 ≥ δ, where, for i ∈ [3], di = gi+1 − gi. Since the former case
results in a bound that is bigger than the one in the statement of our theorem, below we just
consider the latter case where there exists g1, g2, g3, g4 satisfying the conditions stated above.
Also, since M is minimax dominant and anonymous, we can again make use of Masso´ and De
Barreda’s characterization result [MD11, Corollary 1] as we did in Lemma 7.
Now, since d12 + d2 +
d3
2 ≥ δ, we know that at least one of d1, d2 or d3 is at least
δ
2 . Also if
any of d1, d2, or d3 is at least δ, then it is easy to construct profiles so as to achieve our bounds.
Therefore, for the rest of the proof we assume that dc < δ, for all c ∈ [3]. So, given this, let
di ≥
δ
2 for some i ∈ [3], and let us consider the largest j such that yj ≤ gi (again, like in the proof
of Lemma 7, j ≤ n). We have the following two cases, where k = ⌊n2 ⌋.
Case 1: j ≥ n− k. Consider the profile L0 where k + 1 agents report gi and the rest of the
agents report gi+1. Let p0 = M(L0). Since p0 = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, gi, · · · , gi, gi+1, · · · gi+1),
and since j ≥ n− k, we have that p0 = gi. Next, consider the profile L1, where the only change
from L0 is that here agent 1 reports [gi, gi+1 − γ], where 0 < γ < min(
di
2 ,
δ
2), instead of gi. Let
p1 = M(L1). Now, if either p1 > gi or p1 ≤ gi−1 (if such a point exists in A), it is easy to see
that agent 1 will deviate to L0 since her maximum regret for the point gi is lesser in either of
the cases. This in turn implies that p1 = gi. Continuing this way one can reason along the same
lines that for c ≤ k + 1 the profile Lc, where Lc is the same as Lc−1 except for agent c reporting
[gi, gi+1 − γ] instead of gi, the output pc associated with Lc is equal to gi.
Given the observations above, consider the profile Lk+1 where the first k + 1 agents report
[gi, gi+1−γ] and the rest of the agents report gi+1. Now, one can calculate using Algorithm 2 that
the minimax optimal solution popt ≥
gi+(2k+1)(gi+1−γ)
2(k+1) . Also, we know from above that pk+1 =
M(Lk+1) = gi. And so, using the fact that di = gi+1−gi ≥
δ
2 and that popt−pq ≥
(2k+1)(gi+1−gi−γ)
2(k+1)
we can now use the expressions from Lemma 1 to see that maxRegret(pk+1,I) − OMVAC(I) ≥
(2k+1)(gi+1−gi−γ)
2(k+1) , which for an appropriately chosen value of n and γ is greater than or equal to
δ
2 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
Case 2: j < n − k. We can handle this similarly as in the previous case. In particular,
consider the profile L0 where k + 1 agents report gi and the rest of the agents report gi+1. Let
p0 = M(L0). Since p0 = median(y1, · · · , yn+1, gi, · · · , gi, gi+1, · · · gi+1), and since j < n − k,
we know that p0 = min(gi+1, yj+1) (as the (n+1)th largest number will be either yj+1 or gi+1).
However, we know that yj+1 is in the range of A sinceM(yj+1, · · · , yj+1) = median(y1, · · · , yn+1,
yj+1, · · · , yj+1) = yj+1, and also that gi and gi+1 are consecutive in A. Therefore, yj+1 ≥ gi+1,
and we have that p0 = gi+1. Next, consider the profile L1, where the only change from L0 is
that here agent (k + 2) reports [gi + γ, gi+1], where 0 < γ < min(
di
2 ,
δ
2), instead of gi+1. Let
p1 =M(L1). Now, if either p1 > gi+1 (if such a point exists in A) or p1 ≤ gi, it is easy to see that
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agent (k + 2) will deviate to L0 since her maximum regret for the point gi+1 is lesser in either
of the cases. This in turn implies that p1 = gi+2. Continuing this way one can reason along the
same lines that for c ≥ k + 2 the profile Lc−k−1, where Lc−k−1 is the same as Lc−k−2 except for
agent c reporting [gi + γ, gi+1] instead of gi+1, the output pc associated with Lc is equal to gi+1.
Given the observations above, consider the profile Ln−k−1 where the last n−k−1 agents report
[gi+γ, gi+1] and the rest of the agents report gi. Now, one can calculate using Algorithm 2 that the
minimax optimal solution popt = gi. Also, we know from above that pn−k−1 =M(Ln−k−1) = gi+1.
And so, using the fact that di = gi+1 − gi ≥
δ
2 , we can now use the expressions from Lemma 1
to see that maxRegret(pn−k−1,I) − OMVAC(I) ≥
(2k−2)(gi+1−gi−γ)
2k , which for an appropriately
chosen value of n and γ is greater than or equal to δ2 − ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
Finally, combining the two cases above, we have our lower bound.
4 Implementing the maximum cost objective
In this section we turn our attention to the objective of minimizing the maximum cost (sometimes
succinctly referred to as maxCost and written as MC) which is another well-studied objective
function in the context of the facility location problem. In the standard setting where the reports
are exact, the maximum cost associated with locating a facility at p is defined as maxi∈[n]C(xi, p)
and if we assume without loss of generality that the xis are in sorted order, then one can easily
see that the optimal solution to this objective is to locate the facility at p = x1+xn2 . However,
unlike in the case of the average cost objective that was considered in Section 3, one cannot design
an optimal strategyproof mechanism even when the reports are exact, and it is known that the
best one can do in terms of additive approximation is to achieve a bound of B4 in the case of
deterministic mechanisms and B6 in the case of randomized mechanisms [GT17, Theorems 5, 15].
Now, coming to our setting, unlike in the case of the average cost objective, calculating the
minimax optimal solution is straightforward in this case. In fact, given the candidate locations
[ai, bi] for all i, if L1, · · · , Ln and R1, · · · , Rn denote the sorted order of the points in {ai}i∈[n] and
{bi}i∈[n], respectively, then it is not too hard to show that the minimax optimal solution is the
point L1+R1+Ln+Rn4 (a complete discussion on how to find the minimax optimal solution when
using the maximum cost objective is in Appendix E). Therefore, below we directly move on to
implementation using the solution concepts defined in Section 2.1.
4.1 Implementation in very weakly dominant strategies
In the case of the maximum cost objective we again see that very weak dominance is too strong a
solution concept as even here it turns out that we cannot do any better than the naive mechanism
which always outputs the point B2 as the solution. The following theorem, which can be proved
by proceeding exactly like in the proof of Theorem 3, formalizes this statement.
Theorem 9. Given a δ ∈ (0, B], let M = (X,F ) be a deterministic mechanism that implements
α-OMVMC in very weakly dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-facility-location-game. Then,
α ≥ B2 .
Given the negative result, we move on to implementation in minimax dominant strategies in
the hope of getting an analogous positive result as Theorem 6.
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4.2 Implementation in minimax dominant strategies
When it comes to implementation in minimax dominant strategies, we again see that even in the
case of the maxCost objective function one can do a lot better under this solution concept than
under very weak dominance. But before we see the exact bounds one can obtain here, recall that
Theorem 4 rules out the existence of mechanisms that are anonymous, minimax dominant, and
onto. Hence, our focus will be on non-onto mechanisms. We note that the ideas in the following
section can be broadly described as being similar to the ones in Section 3.3.1 since here, too, we
focus on similar “grid-based” mechanisms.
4.2.1 Non-onto mechanisms
In this section we show that there exists a mechanism, δ2 -equispaced-phantom-half, that imple-
ments
(
B
4 +
3δ
8
)
-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies. The mechanism is similar to the
δ
2 -equispaced-median mechanism shown in Algorithm 1 and can be considered as an extension to
the phantom-half mechanism proposed by Golomb and Tzamos [GT17]. Hence, we only highlight
the changes in the description below.
δ
2-equispaced-phantom-half. Consider the mechanism described in Algorithm 1. We need
to make only two changes: i) instead of the definition of A used in Algorithm 1, we define it to
be the set {g1, · · · , gj , · · · , gm}, where gj =
B
2 , gi+1 − gi =
δ
2 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, g0 ≥ 0, and
gm ≤ B. ii) instead of returning the median of the lis in line 21, we return the median of the
points ℓmin,
B
2 , and ℓmax, where ℓmin = mini{ℓi} and ℓmax = maxi{ℓi}.
Below, we show that the δ2 -equispaced-phantom-half mechanism described above implements(
B
4 +
3δ
8
)
-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies.
Theorem 10. Given a δ ∈ [0, 2B3 ], the
δ
2-equispaced-phantom-half mechanism is anonymous
and one that implements
(
B
4 +
3δ
8
)
-OMVMC in minimax dominant strategies for a δ-uncertain-
facility-location-game.
Proof (sketch). The proof that the δ2 -equispaced-phantom-half mechanism is minimax dominant
is very similar to the proof of Lemma 5 where we show that the δ2 -equispaced-median mechanism
is minimax dominant. Therefore, below we only show that it achieves an approximation bound
of (B4 +
3δ
8 ).
To prove the bound, we begin by defining some notation and making a few observations. Let
L0 = ([a1, b1], · · · , [an, bn]) be a profile of candidate locations of the agents and let {L1, · · · , Ln}
and {R1, · · · , Rn} be the sorted order of the ais and bis, respectively. Also, let ℓi be the ℓi
associated with the agent i in the mechanism (see Algorithm 1), ℓmin = mini{ℓi}, and ℓmax =
maxi{ℓi}. From the mechanism we know that ℓi ∈ [xi, yi], where xi and yi are as defined in the
mechanism (see lines 3-4 in Algorithm 1). Additionally, for two agents i and j, if ai ≤ aj, then
it is clear from the definition of xks (see line 3 in Algorithm 1) that xi ≤ xj. Similarly, it again
follows from the definition of yks that for two agent i and j, if bi ≤ bj , then yi ≤ yj.
Next, consider the agent associated with L1 (i.e., the agent who reports the smallest left
endpoint). Without loss of generality we can assume that this agent is agent 1. From the
discussion above we know that for every agent i > 1, we have that ℓi ≥ xi ≥ x1 (since their left
endpoint are at least L1). Therefore, ℓmin = minj{ℓj} ≥ x1, and since x1 ≥ L1 −
δ
4 (this easily
follows from the definition of xi and the fact that the points in A are placed at a distance of
δ
2
apart), we have that ℓmin ≥ L1−
δ
4 . Now, one can employ a similar line of reasoning to see all of
the following: ℓmax ≤ Rn +
δ
4 , ℓmin ≤ R1 +
δ
4 , and ℓmax ≥ Ln −
δ
4 .
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Given all the observations above, we are now ready to prove our bound. To do this, let us
consider the following cases. In each of these cases, we will show that the output p of the δ2 -
equispaced-phantom-half mechanism is at a distance of at most (B4 +
3δ
8 ) from popt, where from
Proposition 14 we know that popt =
L1+R1+Ln+Rn
4 .
Case 1: p = B2 . In this case, we have,
|popt − p| ≤ max
(
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4
− p, p−
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4
)
= max
(
R1 − L1
4
+
Rn + Ln
4
+
L1
2
− p, p−
Rn
2
+
Rn − Ln
4
−
R1 + L1
4
)
≤ max
(
δ
4
+
ℓmin +
δ
4
2
,
B
2
−
(ℓmax −
δ
4)
2
+
δ
4
)
(since p = B
2
, Ri − Li ≤ δ (using Claim 1), ℓmin ≥ L1 −
δ
4
, and ℓmax ≤ Rn +
δ
4
)
≤ max
(
3δ
8
+
B
4
,
B
4
+
3δ
8
)
(since ℓmin ≤ B2 ≤ ℓmax)
=
B
4
+
3δ
8
Case 2: p = ℓmin. In this case, we have,
|popt − p| ≤ max
(
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4
− p, p−
R1 +Rn + L1 + Ln
4
)
≤ max
(
R1 − L1
4
+
Rn + Ln
4
+
L1
2
− p, p−
R1
2
−
L1
2
)
(since L1 ≤ Ln and R1 ≤ Rn)
≤ max
(
δ
4
+
B
2
+
δ
8
−
ℓmin
2
,
R1
2
−
L1
2
+
δ
4
)
(since p = ℓmin, Ri − Li ≤ δ (using Claim 1), ℓmin ≥ L1 − δ4 , and ℓmin ≤ R1 +
δ
4
)
≤ max
(
3δ
8
+
B
4
,
3δ
4
)
(since B
2
≤ ℓmin ≤ ℓmax)
=
B
4
+
3δ
8
(since δ ≤ 2B
3
)
Case 3: p = ℓmax. This can be handled analogously as in Case 2.
Finally, since from all the cases above we have that |popt − p| ≤ (
B
4 +
3δ
8 ), one can easily
see using Lemma 13 that for I = [a1, b1] × · · · × [an, bn], maxRegret(p,I) − OMVMC(I) is also
bounded by
(
B
4 +
3δ
8
)
.
Given this result, it is natural to ask if we have a lower bound like the one in Section 3.3.1.
Unfortunately, the only answer we have is the obvious lower bound of B4 that follows from the
result of Golomb and Tzamos [GT17, Theorem 15] who showed that under exact reports, and
when using deterministic mechanisms, one cannot achieve a bound lower than B4 .
5 Conclusions
The standard assumption in mechanism design that the agents are precisely aware of their com-
plete preferences may not be realistic in many situations. Hence, we believe that there is a
need to look at models that account for partially informed agents and, at the same time, design
mechanisms that provide robust guarantees. In this paper, we looked at such a model in the
context of the classic single-facility location problem, where an agent specifies an interval instead
of an exact location, and our focus was on designing robust mechanisms that perform well with
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respect to all the possible underlying true locations of the agents. Towards this end, we looked at
two solution concepts, very weak dominance and minimax dominance, and we showed that, with
respect to both the objective functions we considered, while it was not possible to achieve any
good mechanism in the context of the former solution concept, extensions to the classical optimal
mechanisms—i.e., mechanisms that perform optimally in the classical setting where the agents
exactly know their locations—performed significantly better under the latter, weaker, solution
concept.9 Our results are summarized in Table 1.
There are some immediate open questions in the context of the problem we considered like
looking at randomized mechanisms, providing tighter bounds, and potentially even finding deter-
ministic mechanisms that perform better than the ones we showed. More broadly, we believe that
it will be interesting to revisit the classic problems in mechanism design, see if one can look at
models which take into account partially informed agents, and design mechanisms where one can
explicitly relate the performance of the mechanism with the quality of preference information.
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A Additional discussions
A.1 Why regret?
As stated in the introduction, our performance measure is based on minimizing the maximum
regret. So, one question that could immediately arise is: “why regret?” We argue below why this
is a good measure by considering some alternatives.
1. Perhaps one of the first approaches that comes to mind is to see if we can, for every possible
input I ∈ I, bound the ratio of the objective values of a) the outcome that is returned
by the mechanism and b) the optimal outcome for that input. For instance, this is the
approach taken by Chiesa et al. [CMZ12] in the case of single good auctions. However, here
this is not a good measure because we can quickly see that this ratio is always unbounded
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if there exists a point that is in the candidate locations of all the agents (i.e., if there is a
p ∈ [0, B] such that for all i ∈ [n], p ∈ [ai, bi]).
2. Another natural approach that could be taken is to show that for all possible inputs we can
bound the difference between the objective values of a) the outcome that is returned by the
mechanism and b) the optimal outcome for that input. For instance, this is the approach
taken by Chiesa et al. [CMZ15]. Technically, this is essentially what we are doing when
using regret and finding an answer that has a max. regret that is additively close to the
max. regret associated with the minimax optimal solution (one could argue in a similar way
even when approximating multiplicatively—i.e., when finding an answer that has a max.
regret that is multiplicatively close to the max. regret associated with the minimax optimal
solution). The reason why using regret is more informative is because if we were to just
mention that, for all I ∈ I, the point p that is returned by the mechanism satisfies,
S(I, p)− S(I, pI) ≤ X,
where X is the bound we obtain, then the only information this conveys is that for every
I we are additively at most X-far from the optimal objective value, pI , for I. However,
instead, if we were to write it as
maxRegret(p,I)−maxRegret(popt,I) ≤ Y,
where popt is the minimax optimal solution, then this conveys two things: a) for any point p
′
there is at least one I ∈ I such that S(I, p′)− S(I, pI) ≥ Z, where Z = maxRegret(popt) =
optimal minimax value (i.e., it gives us a sense on what is achievable at all—which in turn
can be thought of as a natural lower bound) and b) the point p that is chosen by the
mechanism is at most (Y + Z)-far from the optimal objective value for any I ∈ I. Hence,
to convey these, we employ the notion of regret.
A.2 Approximating additively vs multiplicatively
Even when working with regret, when it comes to implementing a particular objective using some
solution concept, one could potentially aim to find a solution p such that F = maxRegret(p,I)maxRegret(popt,I)
is bounded (i.e., use a multiplicative approximation rather than additive). Although this is
reasonable, there at at least two issues that become apparent:
1. When considering implementation in very weakly dominant strategies, it turns out that it is
possible to show that there are no bounded mechanisms when using either of the objective
functions (this is can be proved by proceeding like in the proof of Theorem 3)
2. When considering the objective of minimizing the maximum cost and minimax dominant
strategies, it becomes very quickly clear that minimax dominant strategies are useless to look
at as there are no bounded mechanisms. Why? Because suppose there was one. Then this
implies that when the reports are exact—meaning every agent reports a single point—the
mechanism should always return the optimal solution associated with this location profile,
for if otherwise F will not be bounded as minimum maximum regret when valuations are
exact is zero. However, given that a minimax dominant mechanism is weakly dominant
under exact reports, this in turn implies that we now have a mechanism that implements
the optimal solution associated with the max. cost objective in weakly dominant strategies
when the reports are exact. But then, we already know that there is no such mechanism
due to a result by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [PT13, Theorem 3.2].
Hence, we focus on additive approximations.
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B Revelation principle for minimax dominant strategies
Below we show that in the setting under consideration the revelation principle holds with respect
to minimax dominant strategies.
Lemma 11. Let M be a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in minimax
dominant strategies. Then, there exists a direct mechanism M′ that implements f and where for
every agent i reporting her candidate locations Ki is a minimax dominant strategy.
Proof. Let (s1, · · · , sn) be the minimax dominant strategy in M such that f(K1, · · · ,Kn) =
F (s1(K1), · · · sn(Kn)), where F (·) is the outcome function associated with M. Next, let us
define the outcome function, F ′, associated with M′ as
F ′(K1, · · · ,Kn) = F (s1(K1), · · · sn(Kn)). (9)
Now, using the fact that (s1, · · · , sn) is a minimax dominant strategy in M, we have that
∀K ′i,∀K−i,
max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i))−C(ℓi, F (σi(ℓi), s−i(K−i))
≤ max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, F (si(K
′
i), s−i(K−i))− C(ℓi, F (σi(ℓi), s−i(K−i))). (10)
Additionally, if ℓi is the true location of agent i, then, again, using the fact that (s1, · · · , sn)
is a minimax dominant strategy, we have that ∀s′i ∈ Σi,∀K−i,
C(ℓi, F (si(ℓi), s−i(K−i)) ≤ C(ℓi, F (s
′
i(ℓi), s−i(K−i)). (11)
Therefore,
min
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, F (σi(ℓi), s−i(K−i)) = C(ℓi, F (si(ℓi), s−i(K−i)),
and using this in Equation 10 we have that ∀K ′i,∀K−i,
max
ℓi∈Ki
C(ℓi, F (si(Ki), s−i(K−i)))− C(ℓi, F (si(ℓi), s−i(K−i)))
≤ max
ℓi∈Ki
C(ℓi, F (si(K
′
i), s−i(K−i)))− C(ℓi, F (si(ℓi), s−i(K−i))). (12)
This in turn implies that using Equation 9 we have that ∀K ′i,∀K−i,
max
ℓi∈Ki
C(ℓi, F
′(Ki,K−i))− C(ℓi, F
′(ℓi,K−i)) ≤ max
ℓi∈Ki
C(ℓi, F
′(K ′i,K−i))− C(ℓi, F
′(ℓi,K−i)),
or in other words that reporting the candidate locations Ki is a minimax dominant strategy in
M′.
C Additional claims
Claim 1. For all i ∈ [n], Li ≤ Ri. Additionally, Ri − Li ≤ δ.
Proof. Note that the statement is true if we show that for every Li there are at most (i − 1)
values in {Rk}k∈[n] such that they have a value less than Li (this is enough as this would imply
that Ri ≥ Li). To see why that is true, consider the numbers Li, · · · , Ln which are left endpoints
of the reports of some agents. We know that each of these have a right endpoint associated with
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them (i.e., a b′, where the input is of the form [Li, b
′]) that are greater than them. Now, these
constitute (n− i+1) numbers and since there are only n in total, there can at most i−1 of them
that have value less than Li.
To see the second part of the claim, consider the smallest j such that Rj − Lj > δ. Now, if
b is the right endpoint associated with Lj, then the fact that Rj − Lj > δ implies that b < Rj
(because otherwise Rj − Lj ≤ b− Lj ≤ δ). Additionally, this in turn also implies that for some
Lk, where k ∈ {1, · · · , j − 1}, there is a right endpoint b
′ associated with Lk such that b
′ ≥ Rj.
However, since j is the smallest index value such that Rj −Lj > δ, we now have a contradiction
as δ < Rj − Lj < Rj − Lk ≤ b
′ − Lk ≤ δ.
Claim 2. For any input I = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn), ℓi ∈ [Li, Ri].
Proof. Recall that, as mentioned under notations in Appendix D, the ℓs are in sorted order and
I is valid input if and only if there is a entry associated with every agent in it (i.e., for every
agent i, ∃j : ℓj ∈ [ai, bi]). Now, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that ℓi < Li. This
implies that for I to be a valid input, there has to be (n− i+1) values in it that are greater than
ℓi—one from each agent i who reported an interval [ai, bi] such that ai ≥ Li. However, this is not
possible since there can only be at most (n− i) values greater than ℓi as ℓi is the ith element in
a sorted list.
Similarly, one can argue analogously for the case when ℓi > Ri. Therefore, ℓi ∈ [Li, Ri].
Claim 3. If popt is a minimax optimal solution, then obj
AC
1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt).
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume without loss of generality that objAC1 (popt) <
objAC2 (popt). Also, for the point popt, let j be the smallest index such that Rj > popt and j ≤ k
(if no such j, then set j = k+1) and let h be the largest index such that Lh < popt and h ≥ k+2
(if no such h, then set h = k + 1). Note that if n is even, then both j and h cannot be k + 1,
for if so then objAC1 (popt) would be equal to obj
AC
2 (popt). Now, consider the point p = popt − ǫ,
where ǫ =
n(objAC2 (popt)−obj
AC
1 (popt))
max((n−2j+2),(2h−n)) , and let us compute obj
AC
1 (p) and obj
AC
2 (p).
objAC1 (p) =
1
n

2 k∑
i=j′
(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)


(j′ the smallest index such that Rj′ > p and j′ ≤ k (if no such j′, then set j′ = k + 1))
=
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − (popt − ǫ)) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − (popt − ǫ))

 (note that j′ = j10)
= objAC1 (popt) +
1
n
ǫ(n− 2j + 2)
≤
objAC1 (popt) + obj
AC
2 (popt)
2
< objAC2 (popt).
Computing objAC2 (p) similarly we see that obj
AC
2 (p) < obj
AC
2 (popt). Now, since obj
AC
1 (p) <
objAC2 (popt) and obj
AC
2 (p) < obj
AC
2 (popt), this implies that popt cannot be the minimax optimal
solution as its maximum regret is larger than that of p’s.
10because if not then popt is not optimal since we can move to Rj′ 6= Rj and it can be verified that this point
has regret less than that of popt.
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Claim 4. In the δ2-equispaced-median mechanism, let [a, b] be an interval of length at most δ and
let x and y be the points that are closest (with ties being broken in favour of points in [a, b] in
both cases) to a and b, respectively. Then, the interval [x, y] can have at most 3 points that are
also in A.
Proof. Suppose this were not the case and there existed two other points x′ < y′ such that
x′, y′ ∈ A and x′, y′ ∈ (x, y). Now, for this to happen x has to be less than a and y has to be
greater than b, for if otherwise then using the fact that x and y are the points that are the closest
(with ties broken in favour of points in [a, b]) to a and b, respectively, one can see that we can
have only at most 3 points in [x, y]. However, this would imply that
2(b− a) = (b− y′ + y′ − x′ + x′ − a) + (b− a)
> (y − b) + (y′ − x′) + (a− x) + (b− a)
(b− y′ > y − b and x′ − a > a− x, because x, y are closest to a, b and using the tie-breaking rule)
= (y − x) + (y − x′)
= 2δ, (y − x = y − y′ + y′ − x′ + x′ − x = 3δ
2
as the distance between points in A is δ
2
)
which in turn contradicts the assumption that b− a ≤ δ.
Claim 5. Consider a mechanism M = (X,F ) such that it is very weakly dominant for any agent
to report her candidate locations if it is single point. Let i be an agent with candidate locations
Ki = [ai, bi] and p be the outcome of the mechanism for some profile of candidate locations
(Ki,K−i). Then, if pa and pb are the outcomes of M for the profiles (ai,K−i) and (bi,K−i),
respectively,
maxRegreti(p) = max(|ai − p| − |ai − pa|, |bi − p| − |bi − pb|).
Proof. From Equation 1 we know that
maxRegreti(p) = max
ℓi∈Ki
max
σi∈∆(Σi)
C(ℓi, p)− C(ℓi, F (σi(Ki), s−i(K−i))),
where s−i(K−i) is some set of actions played by the others.
Now, since it very weakly dominant for any agent to report her true candidate locations if it
is a single point in M, we have that
maxRegreti(p) = max
ℓi∈Ki
C(ℓi, p)− C(ℓi, pℓ)
where pℓ is the outcome of M for the profile (ℓ,K−i).
Given this, let us assume that the claim is false. This implies that there exists a c ∈ (ai, bi)
such that C(c, p) − C(ℓi, pc) > C(ai, p) − C(ai, pa) and C(c, p) − C(ℓi, pc) > C(bi, p) − C(bi, pb).
However, we will show that this is impossible in both the cases below.
Case 1: c ≤ p. In this case, we have,
C(c, p)− C(ℓi, pc) = |c− p| − |c− pc|
= (p − ai) + (ai − c)− |c− pc|
= (p − ai)− |ai − pa|+ (ai − c) + |ai − pa| − |c− pc|
= C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa) + (ai − c) + |ai − pa| − |c− pc|
≤ C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa) + (ai − c) + |ai − pc| − |c− pc|
(using very weak dominance for single reports)
≤ C(ai, p)− C(ai, pa).
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Case 2: c > p. We can handle this analogously as in Case 1 and show that C(c, p)−C(ℓi, pc) ≤
C(bi, p)− C(bi, pb).
Claim 6. Let popt be the minimax optimal solution associated with I = [a1, b1]×· · · × [an, bn] for
the avgCost objective. Then, if p is a point such that |p− popt| = d and k = ⌊
n
2 ⌋, then
n− 2k
n
· d ≤ maxRegret(p,I)−OMVAC(I) ≤ d.
Proof. If {Li}i∈[n] and {Ri}i∈[n] denote the sorted order of the sets {ai}i∈[n] and {bi}i∈[n], respec-
tively, then from Lemma 1 we know that for any point p the maximum regret associated with p
can written as max(objAC1 (p), obj
AC
2 (p)), where
• objAC1 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑k
i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index such
that Rj > p and j ≤ k (if no such j, then set j = k + 1)
• objAC2 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑h
i=k+2(p− Li) + (n − 2k)(p − Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index such
that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2 (if no such h, then set h = k + 1).
Additionally, if popt is the minimax optimal solution, we know from Claim 3 that OMVAC(I) =
objAC1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt).
Now, let us assume without loss of generality that p < popt. Then, it clear that from above
that objAC1 (p) > obj
AC
1 (popt) and that obj
AC
2 (p) < obj
AC
2 (popt). So considering obj
AC
1 (p), we have
objAC1 (p) =
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)


=
1
n

2 j′−1∑
i=j
(Ri − p) + 2
k∑
i=j′
(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt) + (n− 2k)(popt − p)


(where j′ ≥ j is the smallest index such that Rj′ > popt)
≤
1
n

2 j′−1∑
i=j
(popt − p) + n · obj
AC
1 (popt) + 2
k∑
i=j′
(popt − p) + (n− 2k)(popt − p)


(since Ri ≤ popt for i ≤ j′ − 1 and n · objAC1 (popt) = 2
∑k
i=j′ (Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt))
≤
1
n
(
2kd+ (n− 2k)d + n · objAC1 (popt)
)
(popt − p ≤ d and j ≥ 1)
= d+OMVAC(I)
To see the upper bound, it is easy to see from above that one can set j = k+1 and hence we
would have that objAC1 (p)−OMVAC(I) ≥
(n−2k)
n (popt − p) =
(n−2k)
n · d.
D Minimax optimal solution for avgCost
Given the candidate locations Ki = [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi − ai ≤ δ,
in this section we are concerned with computing the minimax optimal solution popt such that
popt = argminp∈[0,B]maxI∈I
(
S(I, p)−minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p
′)
)
, where I = [a1, b1]× · · · × [an, bn] and
S is the average cost function. Note that from the discussion in Section 3 we know that for
any I ∈ I, minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p
′) = S(I, pI), where pI is the median of the points in the vector I.
Therefore, we can rewrite the definition of popt as popt = argminp∈[0,B]maxI∈I S(I, p)− S(I, pI).
Next, before we move on further to computing popt, we introduce the following notation.
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Notation: Consider the left endpoints associated with all the agents, i.e., the set {ai}i∈[n].
We denote the sorted order of these points as L1, · · · , Ln (throughout, by sorted order we mean
sorted in non-decreasing order). Similarly, we denote the sorted order of the right endpoints,
i.e., the points in the set {bi}i∈[n], as R1, · · · , Rn. Additionally, for i ∈ [n], we use Mi to denote
the mean of Li and Ri (i.e., Mi =
Li+Ri
2 ). Throughout, for I = K1 × · · · ×Kn, we refer to an
element of I as an “input” and whenever we refer to an input I ∈ I, where I = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn),
we assume without loss of generality that the lis are in sorted order (because the agents can
always be re-indexed so that this is true). Also, given a point p, let I1(p) ⊆ I be the set of all
inputs I1 = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn) such that ℓk+1 ≥ p. Similarly, let I2(p) ⊆ I be the set of all inputs
I2 = (ℓ
′
1, · · · , ℓ
′
n) such that ℓ
′
k+1 < p. Often when the point p is clear from the context, we write
I1 and I2 to refer to I1(p) and I2(p), respectively.
Armed with the notation defined above, we can now prove the following lemma (which is also
stated in Section 3), which gives a concise formula to find the maximum regret associated with
a point p for the average cost objective.
Lemma 1. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the average cost objective
can be written as max(objAC1 (p), obj
AC
2 (p)), where
• objAC1 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑k
i=j(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)
)
, where j is the smallest index such
that Rj > p and j ≤ k
• objAC2 (p) =
1
n
(
2
∑h
i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p − Lk+1)
)
, where h is the largest index such
that Lh < p and h ≥ k + 2.
Proof. To prove this, consider the maximum regret associated with locating the facility at p which
is given by maxI∈I S(I, p) − S(I, pI). Given the fact that I = I1 ∪ I2, we can rewrite this as
max(maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p) − S(I1, pI1),maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p) − S(I2, pI2)). Now, let us consider each of
these terms separately in the cases below.
Case 1: maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p) − S(I1, pI1). Let us consider an arbitrary input I1 = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn)
that belongs to I1 (if I1 = ∅, then we define maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1) = 0). Now, the regret
associated with I1 is given by
regret(p, I1) = S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1)
=
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
|ℓi − p| −
(
n∑
i=1
|ℓi − ℓk+1|
))
(as pI1 = ℓk+1)
=
1
n
(
k∑
i=1
|ℓi − p|+
n−k∑
i=1
(ℓk+i − p)−
(
k∑
i=1
(ℓk+1 − ℓi) +
n−k∑
i=2
(ℓk+i − ℓk+1)
))
(as ℓk+1 ≥ p and ℓ1 ≤ · · · ≤ ℓn)
=
1
n
(
k∑
i=1
(|ℓi − p|+ ℓi − p) + (n− 2k)(ℓk+1 − p)
)
=
1
n

j−1∑
i=1
((p− ℓi) + ℓi − p) +
k∑
i=j
((ℓi − p) + ℓi − p) + (n− 2k)(ℓk+1 − p)


(where j is the smallest index such that lj > p and j ≤ k)
=
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(ℓi − p) + (n− 2k)(ℓk+1 − p)


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Therefore, if objAC1 (p) = maxI1∈I1 S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1), then we have that
objAC1 (p) = max
I1∈I1
S(I1, p)− S(I1, pI1) = max
I1∈I1
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(ℓi − p) + (n− 2k)(ℓk+1 − p)

 .
And so, now since ℓi ∈ [Li, Ri] (this is proved in Claim 2, which is in Appendix C), we have
that
objAC1 (p) =
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − p) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − p)

 ,
where j is smallest index such that Rj > p and j ≤ k.
Case 2: maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p) − S(I2, pI2). Like in the previous case, consider an arbitrary
input I2 = (ℓ
′
1, · · · , ℓ
′
n) that belongs to I2 (if I2 = ∅, then we define maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p) −
S(I2, pI2) = 0). Now, doing a similar analysis as in Case 1, we will see that the regret asso-
ciated with I2 is given by
1
n
(
2
∑h
i=k+2(p− ℓ
′
i) + (n− 2k)(p − ℓ
′
k+1)
)
, where h is the largest in-
dex such that ℓh < p and h ≥ k + 2. Therefore, obj
AC
2 (p) = maxI2∈I2 S(I2, p) − S(I2, pI2) =
1
n
(
2
∑h
i=k+2(p− Li) + (n− 2k)(p − Lk+1)
)
, where h is largest index such that Lh < p and
h ≥ k + 2.
Hence, combining both the cases we have that the maximum regret associated with p is
max(objAC1 (p), obj
AC
2 (p)).
Using the lemma proved above, one can show that for the minimax optimal solution, popt,
objAC1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt) (this is proved in Claim 3, which is in Appendix C). And this observa-
tion in turn brings us to our next lemma (which is, again, also stated in Section 3) which shows
that popt is always in the interval [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Lemma 2. If popt is the minimax optimal solution associated with the avgCost objective function,
then popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that popt < Lk+1 or popt > Rk+1. We will
consider each of these cases separately and show that for both the cases Mk+1 has a lesser
maximum regret, thus contradicting the fact that popt is the minimax optimal solution.
Case 1: popt < Lk+1. From Lemma 1 we know that n ·obj
AC
1 (Mk+1) = 2
∑k
i=j(Ri−Mk+1)+
(n − 2k)(Rk+1 −Mk+1), where j is smallest index such that Rj > Mk+1 and j ≤ k (if there is
no such j, then set j = k + 1). Now, consider the input I1 = (R1, · · · , R2k+1) that belongs to
I1(popt) and let us calculate the regret associated with popt for I1.
regret(popt, I1) =
1
n

2 k∑
i=j′
(Ri − popt) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)


(j′ is the smallest index such that R′j > popt and j′ ≤ k)
≥
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − popt) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)

 (j′ ≤ j since Rj > Mk+1 > popt)
>
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − Lk+1) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − popt)

 (as popt < Lk+1)
>
1
n

2 k∑
i=j
(Ri − (2Mk+1 −Rk+1)) + (n− 2k)(Rk+1 − (2Mk+1 −Rk+1))


(as Lk+1 = 2Mk+1 − Rk+1)
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Input: For each agent i, their input interval [ai, bi]
Output: Minimax optimal solution for the given instance
1: popt ← 0, mR←∞
2: Let {Li}i∈[n] be the sorted order the points in {ai}i∈[n] and {Ri}i∈[n] be the sorted order the points in
{bi}i∈[n]
3: Let C = {Ri, Lj |i ≤ k + 1, j ≥ k + 1, Lk+1 < Ri, Lj < Rk+1} and H = {h1, · · · , h|C|} be the sorted order
of the points in C.
4: for each hi ∈ H , where i ∈ {1, · · · , |C|} do
5: xi ← #(Rj), where Rj ≥ hi and j ≤ k
6: yi ← #(Lj), where Lj ≤ hi and j ≥ k + 2
7: S1i ←
∑
(Rj), where Rj ≥ hi and j ≤ k
8: S2i ←
∑
(Lj),where Lj ≤ hi and j ≥ k + 2
9: end for
10: for each [hi, hi+1], where i ∈ {1, · · · , |C|} do
11: if objAC1 (hi) == obj
AC
2 (hi) and obj
AC
1 (hi) < mR then ⊲ Is hi a possible solution?
12: popt ← hi,mR← obj
AC
1 (hi)
13: end if
14: if objAC1 (hi+1) == obj
AC
2 (hi+1) and obj
AC
1 (hi+1) < mR then ⊲ Is hi+1 a possible solution?
15: popt ← hi+1,mR← obj
AC
1 (hi+1)
16: end if
17: pi ←
(n−2k)Mk+1+S
1
i+1+S
2
i
xi+1+yi+(n−2k)
⊲ If popt ∈ (hi, hi+1), then use the fact that obj
AC
1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt)
18: if pi ∈ (hi, hi+1) and obj
AC
1 (pi) < mR then ⊲ Is pi feasible and is it a possible solution?
19: popt ← pi, mR← obj
AC
1 (pi)
20: end if
21: end for
22: return popt
Algorithm 2: Computing the minimax optimal solution.
= objAC1 (Mk+1) +
1
n
(n − 2j + 2)(Rk+1 −Mk+1).
Now, since popt is the optimal solution and maxRegret(popt,I) = objAC1 (popt) (from Claim 3), we
have that objAC1 (popt) ≥ regret(popt, I1), which in turn implies that from above we have
objAC1 (popt) > obj
AC
1 (Mk+1) +
1
n
(n− 2j + 2)(Rk+1 −Mk+1). (13)
Next, let us consider objAC2 (popt). Note that, given Claim 2 and since popt < Lk+1, I2(popt) =
∅. Therefore, objAC2 (popt) = 0, and so from Claim 3 we know that since popt is an optimal solution,
objAC1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt) = 0. However, j ≤ k + 1, and hence from Equation 13 we have that
objAC1 (popt) > 0, thus in turn contradicting the fact that popt is the minimax optimal solution.
Case 2: popt > Rk+1. We can do a similar analysis as in Case 1 to again show that this
cannot be the case.
Hence, from both the cases above, we have that popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1].
Equipped with the lemmas proved above, we are now ready to compute the minimax optimal
solution.
Proposition 12. Algorithm 2 computes popt in O(n log n) time.
Proof (sketch). We know from Lemma 2 that popt ∈ [Lk+1, Rk+1]. So, all we are doing in Algo-
rithm 2 is to consider all the points in C = {Ri, Lj |i ≤ k + 1, j ≥ k + 1, Ri > Lk+1, Lj < Rk+1}
in sorted order (which is the set H in the algorithm) and check if for every interval [hi, hi+1],
whether popt = hi, popt = hi+1, or popt ∈ (hi, hi+1) (lines 10–21). In the last case, since there are
no points in C that are between hi and hi+1, we can use the fact that for an optimal point popt,
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objAC1 (popt) = obj
AC
2 (popt) (from Claim 3, which is in Appendix C) to obtain a value of pi (line
17). In line 18 we just check if this point actually lies in (hi, hi+1) and also see if it is better than
the best solution we currently have.
One can see that through the cases we consider in Algorithm 2 we are trying out all possible
values the minimax optimal solution can take and hence the algorithm is correct. Also, it is easy
to see that this can be done in O(n log n) time.
E Minimax optimal solution for maxCost
Given the candidate locations [ai, bi] for all i, where, for some δ ∈ [0, B], bi − ai ≤ δ, here we
are concerned with computing the minimax optimal solution popt such that popt = argminp∈[0,B]
maxI∈I
(
S(I, p) −minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p
′)
)
, where I = [a1, b1] × · · · × [an, bn] and S is the maximum
cost function. Note that from the discussion in Section 4 we know that if I = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn) (as
stated in Section 3, we can assume without loss of generality that the lis are in sorted order) is a
valid input in I, then minp′∈[0,B] S(I, p
′) = S(I, pI), where pI =
ℓ1+ℓn
2 . Therefore, we can rewrite
the definition of popt as popt = argminp∈[0,B]maxI∈I S(I, p)− S(I, pI).
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Given a point p, the maximum regret associated with p for the maximum cost
objective can written as max(objMC1 (p), obj
MC
2 (p)), where
• objMC1 (p) =
R1+Rn
2 − p
• objMC2 (p) = p−
L1+Ln
2 .
Proof. Consider the maximum regret associated with locating the facility at p, which is given by
maxI∈I S(I, p)− S(I, pI), and the sets I
′
1,I
′
2, where I
′
1 ⊆ I is the set of all inputs such that for
every I ′1 = (ℓ1, · · · , ℓn) that belongs to I
′
1,
ℓ1+ℓn
2 ≥ p and I
′
2 ⊆ I is the set of all inputs such that
for every I ′2 = 〈ℓ
′
1, · · · , ℓ
′
n〉 that belongs to I
′
2,
ℓ′1+ℓ
′
n
2 < p. Since I = I
′
1 ∪ I
′
2, we can rewrite this
as max(maxI′1∈I′1 S(I
′
1, p) − S(I
′
1, pI′1),maxI′2∈I′2 S(I
′
2, p) − S(I
′
2, pI′2)). Now, let us consider each
of these terms separately in the cases below.
Case 1: maxI′1∈I′1 S(I
′
1, p) − S(I
′
1, pI′1). Let us consider an arbitrary input I
′
1 = 〈ℓ1, · · · , ℓn〉
that belongs to I ′1 (if I
′
1 = ∅, then we define maxI′1∈I′1 S(I
′
1, p)− S(I
′
1, pI1) = 0). Now, the regret
associated with I ′1 is given by
regret(p, I ′1) = S(I
′
1, p)− S(I
′
1, pI′1)
= max(|ℓ1 − p|, |ℓn − p|)−
∣∣∣∣ℓn − ℓ1 + ℓn2
∣∣∣∣
= (ℓn − p)−
(
ℓn −
ℓ1 + ℓn
2
)
(as p ≤ ℓ1+ℓn
2
)
=
ℓ1 + ℓn
2
− p.
Therefore, making use of the fact that ℓi ∈ [Li, Ri] (this is proved in Claim 2, which is in the
appendix), we have that
max
I′1∈I
′
1
S(I ′1, p)− S(I
′
1, pI′1) = maxI′1∈I′1
(
ℓ1 + ℓn
2
− p
)
=
R1 +Rn
2
− p = objMC1 (p). (14)
Case 2: maxI′2∈I′2 S(I
′
2, p)−S(I
′
2, pI′2). Like in the previous case, consider an arbitrary input
I ′2 = 〈ℓ
′
1, · · · , ℓ
′
n〉 that belongs to I
′
2 (if I
′
2 = ∅, then we define maxI′2∈I′2 S(I
′
2, p)− S(I
′
2, pI′2) = 0).
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Now, doing a similar analysis as in Case 1, we will see that the regret associated with I ′2 is given
by p−
ℓ′1+ℓ
′
n
2 . Hence, again, making use of the fact that ℓi ∈ [Li, Ri] (see Claim 2), we have that
max
I′2∈I
′
2
S(I ′2, p)− S(I
′
2, pI′2) = maxI′2∈I′2
(
p−
ℓ′1 + ℓ
′
n
2
)
= p−
L1 + Ln
2
= objMC2 (p). (15)
Now, from equations 14 and 15 we have our lemma.
Equipped with the lemma proved above, we can now find the minimax optimal solution for
the maximum cost objective.
Proposition 14. The minimax optimal solution, popt, for the maximum cost objective is given
by popt =
L1+R1+Ln+Rn
4 .
Proof (sketch). Note that the statement immediately follows if we prove that for a minimax
optimal solution, popt, obj
MC
1 (popt) = obj
MC
2 (popt). And the latter proposition is easy to see,
for if objMC1 (popt) 6= obj
MC
2 (popt), then the maximum regret associated with popt is greater than
R1+Rn−L1−Ln
4 , whereas the maximum regret associated with the point
L1+R1+Ln+Rn
4 is exactly
R1+Rn−L1−Ln
4 .
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